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EXTRADITION-RE-

ExTRADITION PRoCEEDINGs-The Consul General of Venezuela filed
a complaint in a federal district court, pursuant to treaty1 and statute,2
seeking the extradition of former President Perez Jimenez for the crimes
of murder and embezzlement. While the required extradition hearings
were pending, Venezuela sought to use the civil deposition and subpoena
procedure8 to compel several New York banks to produce records of
deposits and to give depositions concerning the accounts of Jimenez and
his alleged confederates. Jimenez moved for a protective order' to prevent Venezuela from obtaining and using these records as evidence against
him in the extradition hearings. On appeal from the denial of this motion,
held, appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The courts of appeals have
no jurisdiction of appeals from the decisions of a district judge sitting in
an extradition proceeding under authority of a statute conferring this
power upon "any justice or judge of the United States," 5 since the district judge is not then acting in his capacity as a "district court of the
United States." 8 Jimenez v. A-risteguieta, 290 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1961).
An extradition hearing is a civil proceeding in the nature of a preliminary criminal hearing. In such a proceeding the presiding magistrate
must decide whether the evidence for the demanding government makes
a prima fade case warranting the magistrate's commitment of the accused
VIEW OF

Treaty of Extradition With Venezuela, Jan. 21, 1922, 43 Stat. 1698, T.S. No. 675.
"Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any commis•
sioner authorized to do so by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of
record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged,
that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or commissioner, to the end that
the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of
the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person,
according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant
for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to so remain until
such surrender shall be made." 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1958).
3 Fm. R. Civ. P. 26, 45. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are specifically
inapplicable to extradition proceedings. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5).
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 80(b).
5 18 u.s.c. § 8184 (1958).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958). One judge concurred specially, and only upon grounds that
the order was not final, and hence not appealable.
l
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to the Secretary of State for extradition.7 Whether there can be any direct
appeal from the final decisions of a district judge sitting in extradition
proceedings seems presently unsettled, although there is substantial dicta
that such decisions are not appealable. 8 In the only two previously reported decisions on this issue-both also in proceedings ancillary to the
attempted extradition of Jimenez-federal appellate courts have assumed
jurisdiction, thus tacitly upholding a right of appeal. 9 In the principal
case the Fifth Circuit has apparently overruled its prior decision without
discussion or mention. The many cases which deny, by implication or dicta,
the existence of a right of appeal should not be considered binding in
presently deciding this issue. All involved habeas corpus proceedings,
wherein the limited scope of review is well recognized.1 Close examination of many of these decisions suggests a judicial attitude that some form
of direct review of issues not reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings
would be possible in other situations.11 Also, all these cases were decided
prior to, or based upon cases decided prior to, the establishment of circuit
courts of appeals and the modern federal appellate structure.12
Since Congress admittedly has the power to provide for appeal in
extradition cases,13 the critical question raised in the extradition context
is whether the statutory language "appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States"14 is broad enough to encompass such
appeals from a district judge's decisions. No legislation specifically prohibits such an appeal, nor does any legislative history suggest such an exclusionary congressional intent. The creation by the Fifth Circuit of an im-

°

1 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Bryant v. United States, 167 U.S. 104 (1897);
Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888); Ex parte
Davis, 54 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1931); Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883 (2d Cir. 1897).
s See, e.g., Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920), and cases cited therein; Ornelas
v. Ruiz, supra note 7, at 508; Sternaman v. Peck, supra note 7; In re Keene's Extradition,
6 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
9 Aristeguieta v. Jimenez, 274 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. granted sub nom. Aristc•
guieta v. First Nat'l City Bank, 365 U.S. 840 (1961); First Nat'l City Bank v. Aristeguieta,
287 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 365 U.S. 840 (1961). Cf. Merino v. Hocke, 289
F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961).
10 Sessions v. Manning, 227 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1008 (1956);
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), affd, 344 U.S. 561 (195!!);
Pelley v. Botkin, 152 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Sanders v. Sanford, 138 F.2d 415 (5th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 744 (1944), and see text infra, at note 36.
11
re Oteiza y Lortes, 136 U.S. 330 (1890); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888);
Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883 (2d Cir. 1897); Ex parte Van Aernam, 28 Fed. Cas. 931
(No. 16824) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1854). See also Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925);
Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511 (1916); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); In re
Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F.Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Vandenrelpen, 28 Fed.
Cas. 974 (No. 16844) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877).
12 The original circuit courts of appeals were established by Act of March 3, 1891,
ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826.
1s U.S. CoNsr. art. m, §§ 1, 2. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (dictum) •
. 14 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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plied exception to the appeals statute thus appears somewhat questionable.15
The majority opinion in the principal case cited two habeas corpus cases,16
and two irrelevant decisions17 in stating that the term "judge of the United
States,"18 as used in the extradition statute is not synonymous with a "district court" 11l as used in the relevant appellate review statute.20 But, as
pointed out by the concurring judge,21 it is difficult to perceive how a
United States district judge, while performing judicial functions,22 is in any
way distinguishable from the district court.23 Seemingly it is unreasonable
that the instant decision should be based upon the linguistic differences in
the applicable statutes.
15 It should be noted, however, that one court has dismissed such an appeal for lack
of finality. Merino v. Hocke, 289 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961).
18 In re Oteiza y Lortes, 136 U.S. 330 (1890); and Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457
(1888).
lT Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278 (1895), which merely refused to extend the
scope of a criminal statute beyond its clear language in such a way as to prejudice the
defendant; Textile Mills Security Corp. v. Commissioners, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), decided
only that the court of appeals may sit en bane and still be a court of appeals under the
judicial code which said that a court of appeals shall consist of three judges. For cases
which have held, in various situations, that "court" and "judge" are synonymous, see
infra note 23.
18 18 u.s.c. § 3184 (1958).
111 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1958).
20 By the court's own unfortunate reasoning, however, it would seem that the action
of the judge might be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237
(1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958). Section I defines an "agency" as "each
authority ••• of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts,
or the governments of the possessions [etc.] ••••" Should the court of appeals in the
principal case be consistent in holding the "judge" not a "court," the actions of the
extradition magistrate would be within the purview of the APA. Section IO(c) of the
APA makes reviewable "every final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in any court." This approach raises the following questions: (I) whether
the judge who is performing judicial functions was intended, with reference to the APA,
to be covered by "courts," and is thus exempted [Cf. Newman, What Agencies Are
Exempt From the APA, 36 NoTRE DAME LAw. 320, 323 (1961)]; (2) whether this function
of the judge is a discretionary one whose re,iewability is negatived by § IO(a) of the
APA; (3) whether the statute regarding extradition proceedings and that regarding
appeals may together be so read as to deem the appeal precluded, rather than merely
ignored, by statute, to make applicable the other exception in § lO(a). The requirement
in IO(c) that the action taken by the agency be "final" would seem to be no barrier,
since the reasoning in the principal case rested on the unreviewability of any action of
the extradition judge.
21 Principal case at 108.
22 Nor can it be maintained that an extradition hearing is not a judicial proceeding,
and Congress could not have imposed the duty of conducting such a hearing upon a
district judge unless it were, they being limited to the exercise of the "judicial power
of the United States." U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § I. See United Steelworkers v. United States,
361 U.S. 39 (1959); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); ICC v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894). Cf. Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464
(1930).
23 See United States, Petitioner, 194 U.S. 194 (1904); United States v. McCabe,
129 Fed. 708 (1st Cir. 1904); Tsoi Yii v. United States, 129 Fed. 585 (9th Cir. 1904);
United States v. Gee Lee, 50 Fed. 271 (9th Cir. 1892). Cf. In re Jackson, 55 Nev. 174, 28
P.2d 125 (1934); Guild v. Meyer, 59 N.J. Eq. 390, 46 Atl. 202 (1900); Commonwealth v.
ShawelJ, 325 Pa. 497, 191 Atl. 17 (1937).
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Although most extradition hearings are initiated before a federal district judge,24 a further problem is presented because the statute also authorizes the hearings to be commenced before a United States Commissioner or any state judge of a court of record and general jurisdiction.25
This raises the possibility that the appealability of extradition hearings
might be dependent upon the forum chosen by the demanding government in originating the proceedings. However, such an unfortunate disparity of result could be avoided, at least in the case of proceedings before a commissioner. The district court which appoints the commissioner,
having supervisory control over him as an officer of the court, may assume
control of the proceedings whenever justice demands,2 8 or control the
commissioner's actions and judgments by authority of the so-called "all
writs" statute.27 If the district court reviews or refuses to review the actions of the commissioner, then these district court decisions should be
appealable to the court of appeals to the same extent as if the district
court were itself sitting as the examining magistrate.28 On the other hand,
the possibility of appellate review if the proceedings were originated before a state judge is entirely speculative, since there are no reported decisions or even dicta on this question. Perhaps there could be appellate jurisdiction within the state court system, with ultimate certiorari to the
Supreme Court from the highest court of the state in which a decision
could be had,29 or possibly the proceedings might be removable by the
defendant to a federal district court,30 although one lower court has denied this.31 For removal, the defendant would have to show that the proceedings were a "civil action," 32 but if removable, appellate jurisdiction
24 Fink 8: Schwarz, International Extradition: The Holohan Murder Case, 39 A.B.A.J.
297, 299 (1953).
25 18 u.s.c. § 3184 (1958).
26 United States v. :Berry, 4 Fed. 779 (D.C. Colo. 1880). See United States v. Allred,
155 U.S. 591, 595 (1895); United States ex rel. D'Amico v. :Bishopp, 286 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1961); In re Grin, 112 Fed. 790 (N.D. Cal. 1901), afj'd, 187 U.S. 181 (1902).
27 The courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a)
(1958).
28 See Merino v. Hocke, 289 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961). Cf. Application of D'Amico,
185 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed, 286 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1961). It is
also significant to note that it has been held that a district court can review the actions
of a commissioner in finding, in a preliminary criminal hearing, that there was probable
cause to hold defendant for a grand jury. United States v. Florida, 165 F. Supp. 328
(E.D. Ark. 1958); United States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp. 807 (E.D.S.C. 1953).
29 28 u.s.c. § 1257 (1958).
30 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State Court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending."
28 U.S.C. § 144l(a) (1958).
31 In re Keene's Extradition, 6 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
32 As to the nature of the proceedings, examined in other contexts, compare United
States ex rel. Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.) (civil), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 769
(1927), and United States ex rel. Klein v. Mulligan, 1 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y.) (civil), afj'd,
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would thereafter be the same as if the proceedings were originated in the
federal district court. Thus, regardless of where the extradition proceeding
is begun, the dangers of totally disparate results in appealability may be
circumvented.
In examining the instant decision, the most logical theory upon which
it could be rested is that the unusual nature of extradition proceedings
makes them inherently unappealable-analogizing from the oft-compared
preliminary criminal hearings before a United States Commissioner.33 But
this theory also has several weaknesses. First, the appealability of other
extraordinary judicial proceedings, such as those for disbarment34 and
naturalization,35 has been repeatedly recognized under the same statute.
Second, a preliminary criminal hearing is truly preliminary, to be followed
by other careful judicial steps which are designed to safeguard the substantive and procedural rights of the accused. But, if the right of appeal
were denied, a valid extradition hearing would be the last and only such
judicial proceeding available in this country. Habeas corpus proceedings
provide little assistance in this regard,36 since lying only to determine
whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged was
within the treaty, and whether there was any legal evidence upon which
the magistrate could decide that there were reasonable grounds to believe
the accused guilty.37 Since the decision of the Secretary of State, who has
the final power to refuse extradition,38 will in most cases probably be based
upon the judicial determination, no good reason appears why these crucial hearings should not be as free from prejudicial error as all other cases
supervised by appellate review. In the absence of express congressional
exception, the courts of appeals should have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of a district judge, including those in extradition cases.39
Although the contrary historical doctrine has advantages such as elimination of delay, it is believed that direct appeal can alone insure that the
district court judge keeps within the bounds of his authority.40 Such an
50 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 665 (1931), with Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181,
187 (1902) (criminal), and Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 375 (1901) (criminal).
33 See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); In re Oteiza y Lones, 136 U.S. 330 (1890);
Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888).
34 In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1949); Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884
(6th Cir. 1948); In re Schachne, 87 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1937).
31! Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178
(1922); Estrin v. United States, 80 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1935).
36 Habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for direct appeal. McNamara v.
Henkel, 226 U.S. 520 (1913); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); Council v. Clemmer,
165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
37 Sec cases cited note 33 supra.
38 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1958); but there can be no extradition from the United States
without a prior certification by an examining magistrate, the executive having no
inherent power to extradite on its own initiative. Valentine v. United States ex rel.
Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
89 Cf. Merino v. Hocke, 289 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1961).
40 If it is true that a court of appeals has no jurisdiction in this type of case, then
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approach would prevent, for example, what occurred in the principal case,
where the demanding government turned the extradition hearings into
a "fishing expedition" unconnected with their legitimate purposes.41 The
ramifications of denying the right of appeal in extradition cases should
be carefully reconsidered before the historical doctrine is followed.
MaTtin R. Fine, S.Ed.

the "all-writs" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958), would be unavailable as a means of COD•
trolling or correcting a district judge (except as to the narrow questions reviewable OD
habeas corpus) since this method cannot be used to acquire jurisdiction [United States
v. Mayer, 285 U.S. 55 (1914); Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th
Cir. 1957); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Holly, 185 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1948)], the writs being
used only where the action below would serve to defeat or impair the court's appellate
jurisdiction already defined. Petsel v. Riley, 192 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1951).
As to the necessity of the information desired, see First Nat'l City Bank v. Arilte•
guieta, 287 FJ?d 219 (2d Cir. 1960), cerl. granted, 865 U.S. 840 (1961), reversing 188 F.
Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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